Gold To $2,000 : Deutsche Bank

Deutsche Bank Zwillingstürme

Deutsche Bank Zwillingstürme (Photo credit: madmonk111)

Gold to Gain to $2,000 on Money Printing, Deutsche Bank

Gold will probably rally to a record above $2,000 an ounce next year as central banks ramp up stimulus to sustain the recovery, according to Raymond Key, London-based global head of metals trading at Deutsche Bank AG.

“We’ll take out $2,000, we’ll go higher,” Key said in an interview in Hong Kong, where he attended the London Bullion Market Association’s annual conference. “That’s on the view that they’ll continue to print money.”

Bullion is headed for a 12th annual gain on concern that stimulus by governments and central banks around the world to promote recovery from the global recession and combat the fallout from Europe’s debt crisis will debase currencies and spur inflation. Holdings in gold-backed exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, expanded to the biggest ever last week.

“Gold out of all the metals will be the best performer,” Jeremy East, global head of metals trading and structured inventory product at Standard Chartered Plc, said in a Nov. 12 interview. “The biggest driver of gold will be the ETF.”

Gold for immediate delivery, which rose to a record $1,921.15 an ounce on Sept. 6, 2011, traded at $1,727.02 at 4:08 p.m. in Singapore, 10 percent higher this year. The metal advanced 70 percent from December 2008 through June 2011 as the Federal Reserve bought $2.3 trillion of debt in two rounds of so-called quantitative easing.

Nov. 8 (Bloomberg) — Mark Cutifani, chief executive officer of AngloGold Ashanti Ltd., the world’s third-largest producer of the metal, talks about strikes in the company’s South African mines and the outlook for gold prices. He speaks from Johannesburg with Guy Johnson on Bloomberg Television’s “The Pulse.” (Source: Bloomberg)

Bullion is headed for a 12th annual gain on concern that stimulus by governments and central banks around the world to promote recovery from the global recession and combat the fallout from Europe’s debt crisis will debase currencies and spur inflation. Holdings in gold-backed exchange-traded funds, or ETFs, expanded to the biggest ever last week.

“Gold out of all the metals will be the best performer,” Jeremy East, global head of metals trading and structured inventory product at Standard Chartered Plc, said in a Nov. 12 interview. “The biggest driver of gold will be the ETF.”

Gold for immediate delivery, which rose to a record $1,921.15 an ounce on Sept. 6, 2011, traded at $1,727.02 at 4:08 p.m. in Singapore, 10 percent higher this year. The metal advanced 70 percent from December 2008 through June 2011 as the Federal Reserve bought $2.3 trillion of debt in two rounds of so-called quantitative easing.

‘Takes Time’

“We’re still working out the excesses that we’ve seen in the past,” Jamie Sokalsky, chief executive officer of Toronto- based Barrick Gold Corp. (ABX), the world’s largest producer, said in a Nov. 12 interview. “This takes time, and easy monetary policy is going to have to exist for some time.”

The Fed said Oct. 24 it will buy $40 billion of mortgage debt a month and probably hold interest rates near zero until 2015 to boost economic growth and cut the jobless rate. The Bank of Japan expanded an asset-purchase program on Oct. 30 for the second time in two months and the European Central Bank has said it is ready to buy bonds of indebted nations.

Attendees at the two-day LBMA event, which ended yesterday, become less bullish about the prospects for bullion over the course of the conference. Gold will probably gain to $1,849 by September, according to the average response in a survey of delegates yesterday. That’s down from a forecast for a gain to $1,914, according to a separate survey of delegates on Nov. 12.

Jobs Data

Gold slumped to a nine-week low of $1,672.75 on Nov. 5 as better-than-forecast U.S. jobs data strengthened the dollar. The Dollar Index, which measures the greenback against six major currencies including the euro, has gained 1.1 percent this year as Europe’s fiscal crisis weighed on the euro.

The outlook’s pretty positive for gold but people shouldn’t expect too much, we’re dealing with a market that’s fundamentally long,” said Deutsche Bank’s Key, referring to bets on further gains. “The rally’s becoming more mature.”

Flows into ETFs may total 200 metric tons this year, from 175 tons in 2011, Barclays Plc said in a Nov. 8 report. That’s 4.6 percent of total physical supply of 4,323 tons this year, according to Bloomberg calculations based on Barclays’ figures.

Brazil, South Korea and Russia are among countries that added gold to their reserves this year, data from the International Monetary Fund show. Nations bought 254.2 tons in the first half of 2012 and holdings are on pace to exceed the 456 tons added in 2011, Ashish Bhatia, manager of government affairs at the producer-funded World Gold Council, said Nov. 11.

“With central banks continuing to buy gold around the world and with the macroeconomic environment which is still there, the demand should remain very strong,” said Barrick’s Sokalsky. “We’re not going to see the reaction on the supply side to make up for that in the industry.” 


WEIMAR: The Hyperinflation Horror Story That Haunts Europe and Bernanke

WEIMAR: The Hyperinflation Horror Story That Haunts Europe   and Central Banks

Memories of Weimar still haunt the eurozone today. The European Central Bank, widely considered to be the only institution with the firepower to stem the euro crisis, is somewhat restrained by the legacy of the German Bundesbank.

The Bundesbank – established in 1957 (well after Weimar) – for years before joining the euro was extremely conservative in expanding the money supply because of what happened during the Weimar years. And 90 years later, Germans are reminded of the perils of the printing press, whether or not the comparison is truly apt.

Adam Fergusson authored a book on the subject, entitled When Money Dies – and many consider it to be the definitive work on the Weimar hyperinflation

Germany hoped that it would quickly win the war and reap bounty from the nations it conquered, which – to the government – justified the use of the printing press to fund it:

It may have been true — there is no reason to doubt it — that a short, sharp war and a speedy victory in 1914 had been both hoped for and expected. Together with the prospect of eventual war indemnities extorted from the Entente, this would possibly have justified taking temporary liberties, even outrageous ones, with the known laws of finance…that was indeed how it did begin: in part the natural result of having a self- willed Army itching for war and a Federal Parliament which, though with limited power over the country’s constituent states, still had to find the money to pay for it.

During the war, the German government used extensive propaganda to hide the inflation from the population

The German government appealed to patriotism to fund the conflict, using slogans like “I gave gold for iron,” and “Invest in War Loan.”

Furthermore, it censored information heavily:

Every German stock exchange was closed for the duration, so that the effect of Reichsbank policies on stocks and shares was unknown. Further, foreign exchange rates were not published, and only those in contact with neutral markets such as Amsterdam or Zurich could guess what was going on…Only when the war was over, with the veil of censorship lifted but the Allied blockade continuing, did it become clear to all with eyes to read that Germany had already met an economic disaster nearly as shattering as her military one.

Not only did the Treaty of Versailles impose reparation demands that Germany would never realistically be able to repay, but it also annexed German territory and required the army to fire hundreds of thousands of soldiers:

The implications of these truncations for the German economy were of course enormous: and so were those of the requirement to reduce the German army to a quarter of its size, for it meant that over a quarter of a million more disbanded soldiers were to be thrown on the labour market. Work had to be found for them at any cost, or so it was calculated. What spelt doom were the clauses that made Germany responsible for the war and demanded colossal reparations — in money and in kind — to meet the Allies’ costs.

By September 1920, prices were 12 times as high as they had been before the war

By September 1920, prices were 12 times as high as they had been before the war

By the autumn of 1920, the strains on the economy in the wake of the war were apparent, but employment was still fairly strong:

Food had accounted for half the family budget then, but now nearly three-quarters of any family’s income went on it. The food for a family of four persons which cost 60 marks a week in April 1919, cost 198 marks by September 1920, and 230 marks by November 1920. Certain items such as lard, ham, tea and eggs rose to between thirty and forty times the pre-war price. On the bright side – in contrast to Austria – the official unemployed figure was low, and only 375,000 people were on the dole.

In August 1921, a major political assassination sent the German mark plunging

Matthias Erzberger, a Socialist leader who was a big proponent of taxation, was assassinated in August 1921.

The murder of Erzberger … undermined any remaining confidence that the German economy might be allowed to recover its health…bankers from Switzerland, Italy and Germany soberly concluded that it was impossible for Germany to continue her payments to the Entente and that sooner or later she would have to declare herself bankrupt, followed (they thought) by first France and then Italy. The mark, at 310 to the pound in mid-August, had sped downwards to over 400 by mid-September, and was still going down.

As February of 1922 approached, it became clear that Germany wouldn’t be able to make its reparation payment

In the inevitable event that Germany was not able to make good on the reparations to the Allies by the end of February, 1922, France would occupy a major economic region of Germany:

Germany now needed to find 500 million gold marks before the end of February to pay the Allies, and knew that she faced sanctions by France — the occupation of the Ruhr — in case of default. Default would come unless London helped. The London bankers, however, refused to give the necessary credits unless Germany put her financial house in order and unless French demands became more reasonable. Since no condition could apparently be met without the fulfilment of the others as its preconditions, German bankers now began to fear that the mark might fall to Austrian levels.

But regardless of the politics, by Christmas 1921 ordinary Germans were feeling the squeeze of inflation

But regardless of the politics, by Christmas 1921 ordinary Germans were feeling the squeeze of inflation

kheelcenter on Flickr

By the end of 1921, workers had lost so much faith in the government that many just stopped voting. The economic hardships brought about by inflation were evident in everyday prices:

In the eight years since 1913, the price of rye bread had risen by 13 times; of beef by 17. Those were the commodities which had fared best. Sugar, milk (at 4.40 marks a litre), pork and even potatoes (at 1.50 marks a Ib.) had risen between 23 and 28 times; butter had gone up by 33 times. These were only the official prices — real prices were often a third higher — and all these prices were roughly half as much again as in October, only two months before

The relationship between the strong mark and increased bankruptcies also highlighted class tension

The relationship between the strong mark and increased bankruptcies also highlighted class tension

Hugo Stinnes

Wikimedia Commons

Owners of large industrial conglomerates benefitted from the inflation, so they constantly reminded the populace that amid the economic chaos, employment was still very high:

Hugo Stinnes himself, the richest and most powerful industrialist in Germany, whose empire of over one-sixth of the country’s industry had been largely built on the advantageous foundation of an inflationary economy, paraded a social conscience shamelessly. He justified inflation as the means of guaranteeing full employment, not as something desirable but simply as the only course open to a benevolent government. It was, he maintained, the only way whereby the life of the people could be sustained…In the summer of 1922 the small businessman saw his enemy in the big businessman, personified by Herr Stinnes, ‘the greatest obstacle to currency reform’, as Lord D’Abernon described him.

Then, in June of 1922, the German foreign minister, who was in favor of paying reparations, was assassinated

Then, in June of 1922, the German foreign minister, who was in favor of paying reparations, was assassinated

Walter Rathenau

Wikimedia Commons

Walter Rathenau was a the German foreign minister, and he was often linked to the unpopular stance that Germany should find a way to pay its reparations. He was not trusted by the right-wingers in government.

Rathenau, a Jew like Erzberger, had just undergone, like Erzberger, a vitriolic attack in the Reichstag from the Rightist leader Dr Helfferich.

A few hours later, as Rathenau was driven from his home to the Foreign Office, the path of his car was blocked deliberately by another, while two assassins in a third car which had been following riddled him with bullets at close range. A bomb, thrown into his car for good measure, nearly cut his body in two.

This further worried the international community, and the mark plunged on the news

And anti-Semitism in Germany was rising in general

And anti-Semitism in Germany was rising in general

fw190a8 on www.flickr.com

The consul in Frankfort, Germany described a disturbing trend on the rise in 1922:

It is no exaggeration to say that cultured German men and women of high social standing openly advocate the political murder of Jews as a legitimate weapon of defence. They admit, it is true, that the  murder of Rathenau was of doubtful advantage … but they say there are others who must go so that Germany shall be saved. Even in Frankfort, with a prepondering Jewish population, the movement is so strong that Jews of social standing are being asked to resign their appointments on the boards of companies  …

Then, in the middle of the crisis, the German government took an inopportune holiday, which sent the mark plunging again

In a strange move, the German government decided to go on holiday, which destroyed confidence and exacerbated the crisis:

At what might otherwise have been the height of the immediate crisis at the end of July 1922, the Reparations Commission decided to take its summer holidays, effectively postponing any settlement of the exchange turmoil until mid-August; and  [French prime minister] M. Poincare, bent as ever (it was believed) on Germany’s destruction, sent a Note to Berlin accusing the government of wilful default on its debts, and threatening ‘retortion’. The effect on the financial situation was calamitous. The rise in prices intensified the demand for currency, both by the State and by other employers…much business quickly came to a standstill. The panic spread to the working classes when they realised that their wages were simply not available.

However, by the autumn of 1922, inflation started to outpace wages once again, and everyone felt the pain

However, by the autumn of 1922, inflation started to outpace wages once again, and everyone felt the pain

The mark was cheaper than wallpaper

Wikimedia Commons

Inflation was soaring by Autumn of 1922, and the working class began to lose their edge:

Already, however, a new element had joined the economic crisis. For the first time the wages paid for labour began to lag behind the rise in prices, noticeably and seriously, in spite of everything the monopoly of the unions could do about it. President Ebert, pleading…to engineer a further moratorium on reparations, pointed out that the conditions of existence for the working population had become ‘completely impossible’, and that the downfall of Germany’s economic life was imminent

 

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And in September of 1922, prices for basic goods soared

Basic staples were becoming increasingly out of reach as the mark plunged and German consumers lost an extraordinary amount of purchasing power:

A litre of milk, which had cost 7 marks in April 1922 and 16 in August, by mid-September cost 26 marks. Beer had climbed from 5.60 marks a litre to 18, to 30. A single egg, 3.60 in April, now cost 9 marks. In only nine months… [the] weekly bill for an identical food basket had risen from 370 marks to 2,615.

France’s occupation of the Ruhr region to obtain payment for war reperations sent the Mark plummeting into real hyperinflation

Along with economic devastation, Germany’s loss of the Ruhr was the straw that broke the camel’s back for the mark:

The Ruhr basin in 1923 provided nearly 85 per cent of Germany’s remaining coal resources, and 80 per cent of her steel and pig-iron production; accounted for 70 per cent of her traffic in goods and minerals; and contained 10 per cent of her population. The loss of the Ruhr’s production, and all it implied, was therefore a bale of last straws. At 35,000 to the pound at Christmas 1922, the mark fell to 48,000 on the day after the invasion, and at the end of January 1923 touched 227,500, well over 50,000 to the dollar.

And by the summer of 1923, food shortages were hitting Germany hard

The domestic situation in Germany resulting from the French occupation led to a full-blown food emergency by August of 1923:

On August 10, on which date a printers’ strike broke out to the further interruption of the supply of banknotes, the full weight of the shortage of paper money was felt. Stocks of food disappeared entirely in many communities, and factories were able to pay wages on account only. The railway workers in the British zone, with a wage tariff half that of factory workers, attempted to join the passive resisters of the Ruhr, and asked pathetically whether, if they were not allowed to strike, they could at least be guaranteed by the occupation authorities enough food at fixed prices as well as the money to buy it.

At the end of September of 1923, the German Chancellor declared a state of emergency and put Germany under military rule

Seeing the waning confidence of German workers in the Ruhr and Hitler’s rise to power in the Bavarian region, the German chancellor took decisive action to maintain control of the situation:

On September 26 [Chancellor Stresemann] suspended seven articles of the Weimar constitution, himself declared a State of Emergency…Germany had become a military dictatorship, no less, and by the choice, at that, of a largely Socialist cabinet. The country was divided into seven military districts, with a local military dictator over each. Simultaneously President Ebert announced the end of passive resistance in the Ruhr.

However, it was clear by October that Bavaria was out of the hands of the central government in Berlin

Bavaria, where Hitler was active, showed no deference to Berlin or the chancellor, setting the stage for more internal conflict:

Although Munich and the municipalities of Bavaria were suffering no more than the same economic rigours as anywhere else, it was evident that here was the most explosive mixture in Germany…New decrees were issued daily prohibiting public meetings and strikes, and there was no doubt that the two authoritarian friends, von Kahr and General von Lossow, were in full control. So confident were they, indeed, that they were calculatingly ignoring instructions received from Berlin. Their posture even went to the lengths of refusing Berlin’s order to ban Hitler’s newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter, on October 2, but none the less suspending it for ten days from October 5 for publishing a treasonable article.

Finally, in November of 1923, the German government took action to stabilize the currency

The German government set up the Rentenbank to issue a new currency, the Rentenmark, which would be backed by land and industrial goods.

The Rentenmark finally stabilized the German currency:

As it was, the confidence trick worked. The Rentenmark, the stopgap designed to shift the 1923 harvest, became the weapon which held the field for the billion-mark note until the Reichsmark was brought in a year later. ‘On the basis’, said Bresciani-Turroni, ‘of the simple fact that the new paper money had a different name from the old, the public thought it was something different from the paper mark … The new money was accepted, despite the fact that it was an unconvertible paper currency.It  was held and not spent as rapidly.

And the next month, in December, the food shortages of the summer finally began to recede

Finally, a month after the Rentenmark was introduced, everyday Germans were able to feed themselves again:

Food, however, was beginning to appear again in the towns half way through December; and to the Rentenmark alone was this development due. In 1923, before November, the only increase in animals slaughtered for food had occurred in dogs:* (Mainly used to supply a deficiency in pork.) after stabilisation, the consumption of every article of daily need — beer, pork, coffee, sugar, tobacco — increased regularly, except dogmeat.

However, after a recovery in 1924, a whole new crisis hit Germany in 1925 – mass unemployment

The strengthened currency and subsiding hyperinflationary pressures once again brough German industry to its knees as several firms plunged into bankruptcy, and unemployment soared:

The picture in the first week of December 1925 presented the politicians’ nightmare of 1922: the approach of the genuine, unhidden mass unemployment that the policy of inflation had so largely been designed to avoid. The mark stood steady…By February 1926 the number of registered unemployed soared over 2 million, with depression reaching from Hamburg to Bavaria. The average number of registered unemployed stayed at over 2 million throughout 1926 — otherwise a year of rationalisation, and of economic and industrial recovery — and was still at nearly 1.5 million in December.

This was hugely demoralizing for Germany, which thought it had already been through the worst and was staging a recovery.

And this shock brought increasing divergence between the fortunes of the middle and lower classes

With the new crisis, the tables were turned – the lower classes found themselves unemployed while the middle classes did relatively well:

By May of that year the circumstances of doctors, lawyers, professors and writers and the like had radically changed. They were again able to live in circumstances appropriate to their cultural environment: their fees were being paid, and their services were required in full measure…Only the legions of unemployable whose substance had been dissipated and the hundreds of thousands of workers for whom there was no work bore the outward scars of the great inflation and spoilt an otherwise happy picture.

But post-war Germany never fully recovered, and mass unemployment eventually allowed Hitler to rise to power

Hitler leveraged the mass unemployment to gain support for the Nazi party and quickly rose to political power in the 1930s:

To say that inflation caused Hitler, or by extension that a similar inflation elsewhere than in a Weimar Germany could produce other Right or Left wing dictatorships, is to wander into quagmires of irrelevant historical analogy…On the other hand, the vast unemployment of the early 1930s gave Hitler the votes he needed. Just as the scale of that unemployment was part of the economic progression originating in the excesses of the inflationary years, so the considerable successes of the Nazi party immediately after stabilisation and immediately before the recession were linked (pace the observations of the Consul-General Clive) with its advances in 1922 and 1923.

The crisis Europe faces today is way more dangerous than sovereign debt:

The Gold Investor’s Handbook – click here for  investment profits and much more detail on the ins and outs of investing in gold


Currency Debasement By Central Banks and Social Disorder ( Grise : Societe Generale )

Inflation & Gold

Inflation & Gold (Photo credit: Paolo Camera)

The loss of trust and the Great Disorder

By Dylan Grice ( SocGen), on 25 October 12

At its most fundamental level, economic activity is no more than an exchange between strangers. It depends, therefore, on a degree of trust between strangers. Since money is the agent of exchange, it is the agent of trust. Debasing money therefore debases trust. History is replete with Great Disorders in which social cohesion has been undermined by currency debasements. The multi-decade credit inflation can now be seen to have had similarly corrosive effects. Yet central banks continue down the same route. The writing is on the wall. Further debasement of money will cause further debasement of society. I fear a Great Disorder.

I am more worried than I have ever been about the clouds gathering today. I hope they pass without breaking, but I fear the defining feature of coming decades will be a Great Disorder of the sort which has defined past epochs and scarred whole generations.

“Next to language, money is the most important medium through which modern societies communicate,” writes Bernd Widdig in his masterful analysis of Germany’s inflation crisis, Culture and Inflation in Weimar Germany (2001). His may be an abstract observation, but it has the commendable merit of being true

all economic activity requires the cooperation of strangers and therefore, a degree of trust between cooperating strangers. Since money is the agent of such mutual trust, debasing money implies debasing the trust upon which social cohesion rests.

So I keep wondering to myself, do our money-printing central banks and their cheerleaders understand the full consequences of the monetary debasement they continue to engineer? Inflation of the CPI might be a consequence both seen and measurable. A broad inflation of asset prices might be a consequence seen, though not measurable. But what about the consequences that are unseen and unmeasurable—and are all the more destructive for it? I feel queasy about the enthusiasm with which our wise economists play games with something about which we have such a poor understanding.

Debasing money might be expected to have effects beyond the merely financial domain. Of course, there are many ways to debase money. Coin can be clipped, paper money can be printed, credit can be created on the basis of demand deposits which aren’t there… The effects are ultimately the same, though: the implied trust that money communicates through society is eroded.

To see how, consider the example of money printing by authorities. We know that such an exercise raises revenues since the authorities now have a very real increase in purchasing power. But we also know that revenue cannot be raised by one party without another party paying. So who pays?

If the authorities raise taxes explicitly and openly, voters know exactly why they have less spending power. They also know how much less spending power they have. But if the authorities instead raise money by simply printing it, they raise the revenue by stealth. No one knows upon whom the burden falls. People notice only that they can’t afford the things they used to be able to afford, or they can’t afford the things which everyone else can afford. They know that something is wrong, but they just don’t know what, why, or who is to blame. So inevitably they look for someone to blame.

So it is with monetary debasement, as Keynes understood deeply (so deeply, in fact, that it’s ironic so many of today’s crude Keynesians support QE so enthusiastically). In his 1919 book The Economic Consequences of the Peace, he wrote:

By a continuing process of inflation, Governments can confiscate, secretly and unobserved, an important part of the wealth of their citizens. By this method they not only confiscate, but they confiscate arbitrarily; and, while the process impoverishes many, it actually enriches some. … Those to whom the system brings windfalls … become “profiteers,” who are the object of the hatred…. the process of wealth-getting degenerates into a gamble and a lottery. … Lenin was certainly right. There is no subtler, no surer means of overturning the existing basis of society than to debauch the currency. The process engages all the hidden forces of economic law on the side of destruction, and does it in a manner which not one man in a million is able to diagnose.

Lessons from history

…More tragic still was what German society became during the inflation. Like other Axis countries on the wrong side of the War and now in the grip of hyperinflation, Germany turned viciously on its Jews. It blamed them for the surrounding evil as Romans had blamed Christians, medieval Europeans had suspected witches, and French revolutionaries had blamed the nobility during previous inflations. In his classic Crowds and Power (1960), Canetti attributed the horror of National Socialism directly to a “morbid re-enaction impulse”:

Credit inflation in recent decades

Despite the CPI inflation of the 1970s receding, our central banks have continued to play games with money. We’ve since lived through what might be the largest credit inflation in financial history, a credit hyperinflation. Where has it left us? Median US household incomes have been stagnant for the best part of twenty years.

Yet inequality has surged. While a record number of Americans are on food stamps, the top 1% of income earners are taking a larger share of total income than since the peak of the 1920s credit inflation. Moreover, the growth in that share has coincided almost exactly with the more recent credit inflation.

These phenomena are inflation’s hallmarks. In the Keynes quote above, he alludes to the “artificial and iniquitous redistribution of wealth” inflation imposes on society without being specific. What actually happens is that artificially created money redistributes wealth towards those closest to it, to the detriment of those furthest away.

In other words, the beneficiaries of newly created money spend that money and bid up the price of goods with their higher demand. Those who suffer are those who have to pay newly higher prices but did not benefit from the newly created money.

The credit inflation analog to the Cantillon effect has played out perfectly in recent decades. Central banks provided cheap money to banks, the cheap money artificially inflated asset prices, artificially inflated asset prices made anyone connected to those assets rich as we became a nation of speculators, those riches were achieved at everyone else’s expense, and “everyone else” has now realized what has happened and is understandable enraged. As Keynes explained, “Those to whom the system brings windfalls… are the object of the hatred.”

And now the social debasement is clear for all to see. The 99% blame the 1%, the 1% blame the 47%, the private sector blames the public sector, the public sector returns the sentiment… the young blame the old, everyone blames the rich… yet few question the ideas behind government or central banks.

I’d feel a whole lot better if central banks stopped playing games with money. But I can’t see that happening anytime soon. The ECB has thrown the towel in, following the Swiss National Bank last year in committing effectively to print unlimited amounts of money for the greater good. The Bank of England and the Fed have long since made a virtue of what was once considered a necessity, with what was once the unconventional conventional. As James Bullard told everyone a few weeks before the last Fed meeting, lest there be any doubt: “Markets have this idea that, there’s QE1 and QE2, so QE3 must be the same as those previous ones. It’s not that clear to me that this is the way this is going … it would just be to do balance sheet policy as the exact analogue of interest rate policy.” In other words, the central banks’ balance sheets are the new policy tool. As interest rates embarked on a multi-year decline from the 1980s on, central bank balance sheets are set to embark on a multi-year climb.

So as Nobel Prize winning experts in economics punch the air because inflation expectations have been rising since the policy was announced, “It’s the whole point of the exercise” (Duh!), the Bank of England admits that QE has mainly benefited the rich, but vows to continue anyway.

All I see is more of the same — more money debasement, more unintended consequences and more social disorder. Since I worry that it will be a Great Disorder, I remain very bullish on safe havens.

and Gold is THE Safe Haven Click here  for  investment profits and much more detail on the ins and outs of investing in gold.


What Are German Investors To Do ?

English: European Central Bank, Skyper and Sil...

English: European Central Bank, Skyper and Silver Tower in Frankfurt am Main, Germany (Photo credit: Wikipedia)

What Is Germany Thinking ?

The euro zone enters a dangerous week, strewn with potential landmines, in a somewhat more optimistic mood after investors welcomed a European Central Bank plan to prevent a breakup of the single currency.

German judges, Dutch voters, IMF inspectors and Brussels regulators could all spring surprises that make it harder to resolve a sovereign debt crisis which is almost three years old and weighing on the world economy.

Wednesday is the main day to watch.

Germany’s constitutional court rules then on the legality of the euro zone’s permanent financial rescue fund, the European Commission unveils detailed plans for a euro zone banking union, and the Netherlands holds a cliff hanger general election.

Then European finance ministers meet in Cyprus from Friday to try to thrash out differences over banking supervision and possible extra aid for Spain, the zone’s fourth biggest economy, and Greece, the problem country that first triggered the crisis.

Decisions on Spain and Greece are not likely until October, but the talks may point to whether Madrid will apply for European assistance, at the risk of unpalatable conditions and supervision, and whether EU and IMF inspectors are leaning towards allowing a vital aid installment to keep Athens afloat.

Europe has been holding its breath for two months for the German court ruling, a potential show-stopper.

All 20 legal experts polled by Reuters expect the judges to let the European Stability Mechanism and a European fiscal discipline pact go ahead, but most expect them to add tough conditions for future bailouts.

That could potentially tie Chancellor Angela Merkel’s hands or, at the least, make her backing for bailouts politically even more difficult given a public backlash against last week’s ECB decision to buy the bonds of vulnerable state

 

 

The Precious Metals Bull Market
is Just Beginning to Heat Up

Today, we sit at a historic crossroads.

It’s a once-in-a-lifetime moment when you can make a huge fortune on gold, silver, and other junior mining stocks.

Even though the major resources — gold, silver, platinum, copper, zinc, etc. — have had some astounding runs, we are not anywhere close to the end of this precious metals bull market.

You see, the United States is in terrible economic shape, plagued by an out-of-control national debt. And it’s doubtful we’ll get out of it anytime soon.

As a result, prices of gold, silver, platinum, and other resources have started climbing…

In fact, I’d say that in five years, all of these things — gold, silver, and platinum — will be much higher in value than they are today.

Some currency analysts are calling for gold to hit $5,000 an ounce… and silver $200 an ounce.

And the soaring prices and new technologies are putting previously inaccessible deposits of precious metals and other resources within reach — much faster than ever before.

As a result, these stocks have the potential to shoot up quicker — and higher — than at any time in the past.

It’s a commodities bull market you don’t want to miss out on.

Regardless of what happens to the economy.


Why Junior Silver Stocks Could Deliver You 
Even Bigger Gains than Junior Gold Stocks

Recently, silver has been in a more extreme bull market than gold.

That means the gains we could see here could be astronomical.

You see, the price of silver per ounce has usually been equal to around 1/16th of an ounce of gold — meaning it took 16 ounces of silver to equal a single ounce of gold.

But over the past decade, gold has taken off, leaving silver behind… that is, until last year.

Silver hit a record average annual high price in 2011 of $35.

 

Gold and Silver Requires Knowledge To Profit

Your Investment Library Will Decide Your Investment Success

The Apprentice Millionaire Portfolio

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 500 pages of  proven strategy and portfolio selections in gold, silver, oil and resources to provide insurance from the euro crisis

500 pages of  proven strategy and portfolio selections in gold, silver, oil and resources to provide insurance from the euro crisis